Giving up problem solving by Payne, Stephen J & Duggan, Geoffrey B
        
Citation for published version:
Payne, SJ & Duggan, GB 2011, 'Giving up problem solving', Memory & Cognition, vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 902-913.
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-010-0068-6
DOI:
10.3758/s13421-010-0068-6
Publication date:
2011
Link to publication
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
Giving Up Problem Solving 1 
Running head: GIVING UP PROBLEM SOLVING 
Giving Up Problem Solving 
Stephen J. Payne and Geoffrey B. Duggan 
University of Bath

Bath, United Kingdom

Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to: Stephen Payne, Department 
of Computer Science, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK. Email: 
s.j.payne@bath.ac.uk. 
Giving Up Problem Solving 2 
Abstract 
How do people decide to abandon a problem? Participants were presented with 
unsolvable water-jar problems, having been accurately informed of the prior 
probability of solvability. Across three experiments, we discovered effects of prior 
probability of solvability and of problem-size (number of distinct problem states) on 
measures of effort and confidence. If a problem is more likely to be solvable, and 
allows more problem states then a problem solver spends longer trying to solve the 
problem. Giving-up decisions are informed by the same judgments of probability of 
success and costs of solution that inform move-choice in a rational model of problem 
solving. 
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Giving Up Problem Solving 
In the everyday world and in the classroom, problem solvers may fail to 
complete the problems they attempt. Some problem-solving episodes end with the 
problem solver abandoning the current problem to move to another, or to do 
something else. We contend that an understanding of quitting is an important goal for 
a psychology of human problem solving, yet to our knowledge it has rarely been 
investigated. It is important not only because it is a widespread everyday 
phenomenon, but also because rational decisions to quit are an important component 
of effective behavior – there is little to be gained from continued work on a problem 
that you will never solve. 
Giving up also plays an important role in successful problem solving. The 
decision to give up on one approach for another can be a critical determinant of 
success. For example, the model developed by MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle 
(2001) to explain performance on the nine-dot problem has the abandonment of hill-
climbing as a crucial step in the insight process. According to their account, the 
unsuitability of hill-climbing explains the difficulty of insight problems: its failure 
sometimes prompts potential solutions or “insight”. MacGregor et al. (2001) suggest 
that problem solvers continue until some progress-monitoring criterion is broached. 
Kaplan and Simon (1990) also sketched a model of insight problem solving in which 
a strategy was abandoned when “no operators seem to yield progress” (p. 377). 
However, beyond actually exhausting a problem's possible states, these accounts do 
not provide “stopping rules” for deciding when insufficient progress has been made. 
Stopping Rules in Cognition 
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Looking beyond problem solving per se, there is a recent coincidence of 
interest in understanding stopping rules in a variety of behaviors. Consider, for 
example, memory retrieval. If an experimental participant is asked to recall a list of 
words, say, they will usually be given a fixed time so to do. If, instead, they are free to 
choose when to stop trying, how do they behave? This question was addressed in a 
study by Dougherty and Harbison (2007). These authors suggested that the “exit 
latency” – the time since the last successful retrieval was a sensitive measure of 
persistence, and was affected by prior measures of motivation and personality, as well 
as by the difficulty of the task. They also reported that exit latencies decreased as a 
function of the number of items retrieved and argued this reflected a lower probability 
that later items would be worth retrieving. Alternatively, Laming (2009) argues that 
free recall leads to a state where the same item is retrieved repeatedly and that giving 
up occurs once this state is reached. 
In research on decision making, stopping rules have been used to characterise 
the choice process (e.g. Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). It is hard to relate these rules 
to classic problem solving tasks but of greater relevance are analyses of the 
information-gathering phase that precedes many decisions. Browne and Pitts (2004) 
consider rules that may underpin decision makers' ceasing to acquire information and 
moving to a decision. Such rules may be based on a priori quantity thresholds, e.g. a 
fixed number of bits of information, or on cumulative, relational properties, e.g. a 
decision-maker may search for information until each new item fails to make an 
above-threshold difference to their knowledge-base. 
Stopping rules in Foraging Theory 
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These simple stopping rules suggested by Browne and Pitts (2004) for 
information gathering are similar to the rules-of-thumb that have been proposed in the 
foraging literature to explain how animals decide to abandon one patch for another 
(see Stephens & Krebs, 1986, Chapter 8). Moreover, the connection between 
information gathering and animal foraging has been emphasised by Pirolli and Card 
(1999). 
Most work in optimal foraging theory analyses the optimal solution to an 
animal's problems, such as diet selection or patch leaving. Some work on patch-
leaving instead explores heuristics that animals might actually compute. Optimal 
giving up decisions may require computations of marginal and cumulative rates of 
return (Charnov, 1976) that are too costly to be realistic, but rules-of-thumb may offer 
cheap approximations, by tracking time and encounters with food items. 
One simple foraging rule would be to leave any patch after a fixed amount of 
time; another would be to leave after a fixed number of successes. Such rules are 
adaptive under some environmental conditions (Iwasa, Higashi, & Yamamura, 1981). 
A more flexible rule is to quit after a certain time since the last success, or to allow a 
certain amount of time for each patch, but adjust this upwards with every success.
 Recent experimental work has investigated whether such heuristics may 
explain human decisions to abandon foraging-like tasks. Payne, Duggan and Neth 
(2007), assigned participants two sets of seven letters and asked them to generate as 
many words as possible in total, working on the sets of letters in sequence and 
switching between them as they preferred. The word-finding task is quite similar to 
the situations analysed in foraging in that the problem-solver is continuously 
accumulating units of a particular currency (i.e. words instead of food items). Payne et 
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al.’s (2007) analysis of giving up therefore exploited concepts from foraging theory, 
such as time since last success and number of items encountered or generated (see 
also Hutchinson, Wilke & Todd, 2008; Wilke, Hutchinson, Todd & Czienskowski, 
2009). 
Payne et al. (2007) found that a rule based on time since last success – (what 
foraging theorists call "giving-up time" but Dougherty and Harbison referred to as 
“exit latency”) could not account for their participants’ switch decisions. Instead they 
modelled participants’ behavior with a more complex heuristic that is sensitive to the 
rate at which items are generated, in concert with a probabilistic decision to switch 
tasks immediately after a subgoal success. 
Obviously, classical problem solving tasks do not have the continuous 
accumulation character of foraging. Instead, their gain curve may be considered to be 
a step function, with success determined discretely by accomplishment of a single 
goal state. Nevertheless patch-leaving heuristics might apply, if problem solvers treat 
the attainment of certain problem states (perhaps all new problem states) as the 
accumulated currency. Thus a problem solver could quit a problem after a fixed 
amount of time, or after a fixed number of new problem states, or when the time since 
the last new problem state exceeds a threshold. 
Rational analysis of problem solving 
A different account of giving up problem solving might begin with an analysis 
of rational choice of moves. Anderson (1990) proposed that many important 
regularities in human cognition could be understood by assuming the mind is adapted 
to statistical properties of its environment, and by comparing behavior with optimal 
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solutions to information-processing problems (as in foraging theory). Anderson's 
(1990) rational analysis of problem solving sketches a plausible account of how an 
optimal problem solver should approach problems, which incorporates an analysis of 
when to give up (although the quit decision is not emphasised in Anderson's work). 
According to the analysis, a rational problem solver should choose among 
partial plans so as to maximise PG-C, where P is the probability of achieving a goal if 
a behavior is enacted, G is the gain or value assigned to that goal and C is the cost that 
will be incurred to achieve the goal, given the behavior. It is assumed that PG-C is 
estimated for a set of alternative problem solving plans, and used to choose among 
them, with a Bayesian update of the probability and cost evinced by the new problem 
states that are thus visited, and a monitoring of effort expended so far.  The currencies 
for G and C are not specified, nor is the construct of effort. To simplify, one might 
consider time as the currency for all three, with the Gain of a problem being the total 
length of time it would be worth investing in order to solve it (see also Gray, Sims, Fu 
& Schoelles, 2006). The starting value of P depends on an assumed distribution 
incorporating a parameter for the a priori probability that the problem is solvable. 
Anderson (1990) applies this rational analysis of problem solving to a handful 
of classic 'puzzles' from the problem solving literature: 'Missionaries & Cannibals' 
(e.g. Jeffries, Polson, Razran & Atwood, 1977); Water Jars (e.g. Atwood & Polson, 
1976) and Tower of Hanoi (e.g. Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985).  The theory is 
general to any problem solving situation, but the analysis is best developed when 
problem solvers use the hill-climbing heuristic, as Anderson assumes is true, with 
strong backing from the experimental literature cited above, for Missionaries & 
Cannibals and for Water Jars, the latter being the problems studied in this article. In 
such cases, the partial plans referred to above are single moves, and PG-C for each 
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move is estimated based on an assessment each possible next state's similarity to the 
goal (for the water jars problem this is operationalised as the arithmetic difference of 
jar-contents between the state and the goal state) and its novelty (i.e., how many times 
the problem solver has already visited the state). 
Our interest is in how readily this model accounts for giving up. The key claim 
is this: a rational problem solver should give up when estimated PG-C approaches 
zero for all considered partial plans. An elegant aspect of this analysis of giving-up is 
that it is completely integrated with problem solving per se. Deciding to give up is 
simply a special case, using the same environmental and metacognitive information as 
is used to decide between moves. (It is true that both prior probability and effort-so-
far have an effect on the PG-C estimates of ALL competing moves: they nevertheless 
influence move-choice by affecting the relative influence of the similarity to the goal 
and the novelty factors). 
Experiments and Predictions 
The experiments in this article all use computerised versions of Water Jars 
problems, in which water must be transferred among a set of jars to obtain a goal 
quantity in one or two of the jars. Our main experimental innovation is simple – to 
present participants with unsolvable problems (that they know might be unsolvable) 
and measure the effort expended (in terms of time and number of moves) before 
giving up. 
In the problems studied by Luchins (1942), there were three jars of different 
capacities, all of which began empty. The goal was to achieve a particular quantity in 
the largest jar, and the operators were to fill jars (from a tap), empty them, or transfer 
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water from one jar to another until the destination jar was full. We call this type of 
problem “open”. 
In the studies modelled by Anderson (1990; Atwood & Polson, 1976), there 
were again three jars, but there was no tap, and no sink. Instead, the largest jar began 
full, the other two jars empty. The only operators were transfers and the goal was to 
divide the water equally among the two largest jars. We call this type of problem 
“closed”. 
In closed problems, the total amount of water distributed among jars is 
constant, and consequently the number of problem states is fewer than in 
corresponding open problems. Because exhausting problem states is a plausible 
stopping rule, we wanted to be sure to set some problems where this was unlikely to 
happen by default. Thus we begin our investigation with open problems. 
We draw our experimental predictions from the PG-C account of problem 
solving. We contrast these predictions with those made by simple heuristics borrowed 
from the foraging literature. 
The PG-C model predicts how much effort a problem solver will expend (i.e., 
how long they will persist) before quitting, in the face of failure. First, the model 
predicts an effect of the problem solver’s estimated likelihood that the problem is 
solvable. A higher prior expectation that the problem is solvable will increase the 
value of P for all moves, making PG-C above zero for more moves for longer as 
problem solving continues. We test this prediction by presenting participants with a 
set of problems, and informing them, honestly, that a certain proportion will be 
unsolvable. By manipulating the proportion, we manipulate the prior probability. 
When a participant attempts an unsolvable problem, they have to give up, and the 
total time to reach this decision is one dependent variable (another measure of 
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expended effort is the number of moves made – although this may not be a very good 
index of mental search, O’Hara & Payne, 1998). This prediction may be challenged 
by the finding that decision makers sometimes fail to make sufficient allowance for 
prior probabilities in the face of individual information about the current problem 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) 
The PG-C model also predicts that total time before quitting will increase 
when there are more problem states to consider. As noted above, PG-C is judged 
higher for states that have been less visited previously. Thus, where there are more 
new states available, PG-C is less likely to approach zero, which translates into a 
simple prediction that problem solvers should take longer to give up when the state 
space is bigger. This hypothesis is tested by manipulating the size of the state space of 
unsolvable problems in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Whenever a participant abandons a problem, we ask them how confident they 
are that the problem is unsolvable. Throughout this article, for clarity in the face of a 
judgment that inverts readers' conventional expectations, we refer to this judgment as 
confidence-unsolvable. 
The PG-C model does not come with a ready-made theory of confidence, but 
one intuitively clear assumption is that it will directly reflect the problem solver's 
current estimations of P (confidence-unsolvable will reflect 1-P). The model supposes 
that problem solvers estimate P for a set of partial plans, and quit when PG-C 
approaches zero for all such partial plans. In making a single judgment about the 
problem, the solver must somehow reduce these estimates of P, perhaps using the 
maximum value or the P of the move with highest PG-C. Given this reading of 
confidence, what does the PG-C model of problem solving predict about post-giving-
up confidence-unsolvable? 
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According to the model, as the problem solver makes moves through the 
problem space, P and C are estimated for each new plan (each move, in the case of 
hill-climbing) that is considered. In particular P will increase and C will decrease 
according to both similarity to the goal and novelty of the next state. Furthermore, 
effort-so-far (which may be approximated by time spent problem solving) will have a 
moderating effect on both P and C, decreasing P and increasing C for all moves (see 
Anderson 1990, pp. 212-213). When the prior probability of solving a problem is low, 
PG begins lower, and PG-C will approach zero sooner for all moves in unsolvable 
problems, and therefore before C has had as much time to grow. Consequently, the 
model predicts that when prior probability of solution is lower, problem solvers will 
quit at lower levels of P and thus report higher levels of confidence-unsolvable.  
This analysis exposes that the effect of low prior probability will be similar to 
the effects of a low G (i.e., a low evaluation by the problem solver of the worth of 
solving a problem). The model thus explains what to us seems intuitively correct - if 
a participant is less motivated to solve the problem, they will work at it for less time 
and report lower confidence-unsolvable when they quit.  This tradeoff between time 
and confidence that is determined by participants' individual level of motivation will 
likely add noise to our experimental data. 
There is no similar prediction for an effect of problem size on reported 
confidence unsolvable. In bigger problems, PG-C will tend to reduce more gradually, 
because revisits to states will be less frequent; but such an effect will be due to both a 
decrease in P and an increase in C, so it is not clear why it should lead to any change 
in the value of P at which PG-C approaches zero. 
Do any models make competing predictions? The foraging heuristics reviewed 
above offer a basis for prediction, if one allows an alternative conception of 
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confidence as a post-hoc judgment about the problem, given the problem solving 
episode. 
First, it seems quite plausible that people may utilise the exit-latency heuristic, 
quitting a problem after a certain time has passed since any new problem states have 
been discovered. This heuristic allows a problem solver to judge that the problem is 
exhausted; it is similar to Browne & Pitts's (2004) "difference threshold", and has also 
been considered for stopping memory retrieval by Dougherty & Harbison (2007). 
Use of an exit latency threshold predicts that time and number of moves will increase 
with problem size, but predicts no effect of prior probability. Assuming that sufficient 
extra time is given to bigger problems to reach a similar judgment of state-exhaustion, 
there should be no effect of problem-size on confidence-unsolvable. It is hard to infer 
a prediction for the effect of prior probability on confidence. 
In the foraging literature, the exit latency heuristic has sometimes been viewed 
as a very simple way of computing marginal rates of return, thus allowing a simple 
approximation to the optimum behavior specified by Charnov's marginal value 
theorem. However, Iwasa et al (1981) have shown that using a simple threshold for 
total time or total number of items can actually improve rates of gain relative to exit-
latency in certain environments, depending on the distribution of rewards in those 
environments. These rules therefore seem worth considering in an experimental 
situation, where participants may make simple assumptions about the variation in 
problems they are likely to encounter. 
So, each participant could simply allocate a fixed amount of time to each 
problem. If such a time budget determines giving up then there will be no effects of 
problem size or of prior probability on time before quitting. However, because in a 
fixed time the smaller problem will be explored more thoroughly, with more visits to 
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repeated states, this stopping rule predicts that confidence-unsolvable will be higher 
for smaller unsolved problems. Prior probability may additionally affect confidence, 
the account is neutral on that matter. 
A second very simple stopping rule assumes problem solvers will quit after a 
fixed number of new, distinct states have been found without the goal being achieved. 
Such a rule would lead to problem solvers spending as long on smaller problems as on 
larger problems, or possibly longer (if new states are harder to find). There will be no 
effect of prior probability. Confidence-unsolvable will be higher for smaller problems, 
if solvers can somehow estimate the number of unvisited states. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Design 
This study was a 2 ! 2 between-subjects design. The first factor had two 
levels. For half the participants one of the four problems they were asked to solve was 
unsolvable, for the other half, three of four were unsolvable. Participants were 
informed of these proportions before they attempted the first problem. We label this 
factor “Prior Probability”. The second factor was the number of states in the problem-
space of the first problem, which in fact was always unsolvable (participants did not 
know that problem order was fixed); this factor also had two levels, and will be 
referred to as “Problem Size”. 
Participants 
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Forty eight undergraduates from Cardiff University were each paid £5.00 (US 
$7.91) or offered course credit to participate. 
Materials 
This experiment used open water jar problems. The capacity of the three jars 
decreased from B to A to C. Each jar began empty, and operators for filling and 
emptying each jar were provided. The goal state was a quantity in jar B, with the final 
quantity of the other jars irrelevant. We denote problems by the capacities of the three 
jars followed by the goal quantity for jar B. The “small” problem was A=18, B=36, 
C=9, Goal=14 and had 30 states in it’s problem space; the “big” problem was A=15, 
B=36, C= 9, Goal=14 (218 states). 
Problems were presented on a computer display (programmed in Hypercard), 
pictured in Figure 1. In the centre of the screen were three rectangles representing the 
three jars. Above each jar was displayed its capacity, and within each jar was 
displayed its current contents. Below the jars were a set of twelve buttons, one for 
each of the six possible transfer operators. A Restart button allowed participants to 
return to the starting state of the current problem. 
Procedure 
The procedure was implemented on a Macintosh computer which stepped 
participants through the procedure, self-paced. The experiment began with an 
explanation of the water jars problem, followed by a practice problem (A=14, B=50, 
C=11, Goal=33) for participants to solve. A solution sequence was presented in the 
top left of the screen, so that participants did not have to work out the solution, 
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although they could if they wished. In either case the solution had to be entered 
interactively in exactly the same way as with the experimental problems. 
Once participants had solved the practice problem they were informed that 
they would be asked to try to solve four problems, and informed the appropriate 
proportion of problems that were solvable (1 or 3 out of 4, depending on experimental 
condition). 
The first, unsolvable problem was followed either by three solvable problems 
or by two more unsolvable problems and then a single solvable problem. The order of 
problems was fixed. Data from the final three problems are not considered in this 
article. 
Each problem screen contained an “Abandon” button, which participants used 
to move to the next problem. Participants were instructed that problems must be 
attempted in strict sequence and that no problem could be re-visited. Participants were 
given a small cash award for all successfully solved problems [£1 (US $1.58) per 
problem]. 
Whenever a participant abandoned a problem, they were presented with a 
question: “How confident are you that the problem you just abandoned really is 
unsolvable? Please click on one of the buttons below to indicate your confidence.” 
Eleven response buttons were numbered from -5: “Although I abandoned the problem 
I am certain it is solvable” to 5: “I am certain the problem is unsolvable”. 
Results 
Untransformed means and standard deviations for each variable under each 
experimental condition are shown in Table 1. No participants visited all problem 
Giving Up Problem Solving 16 
states of either problem. The analyses all relate to the first problem that participants 
attempted, which was always unsolvable. Three main dependent measures of 
performance are considered: time to give up, number of moves, post-hoc confidence 
that the problem really was unsolvable. 
For each dependent variable we consider the effects of Problem Size and Prior 
Probability using between-subjects 2 ! 2 ANOVA. Before ANOVA, times and 
number of moves were log-transformed [ln(N+1) was used as 8 participants made no 
moves]. These transforms made no difference to the pattern of effects. 
Both time and number of moves were greater for the large problem space than 
for the small problem space [Time, F(1,44) = 5.48, MSe = .04, p < .05, !
2
p = .11; 
Moves, F(1,44) = 4.86, MSe = .28, p < .05, !
2
p = .10]. A high prior probability that the 
problem was solvable lengthened the time spent solving and increased the number of 
moves but neither of these effects were significant [Time, F(1,44) = 1.16, !2p = .03; 
Moves, F(1,44) = .58, !2p = .01] 
Confidence-unsolvable was higher for the small problem space than the large 
problem space, F(1,44) = 4.38, MSe = 4.48, p < .05, !
2
p = .09, and was higher for low 
prior probability that the problem can be solved, F(1,44) = 8.25, MSe = 4.48, p < .01, 
!
2
p = .16. 
None of the analyses revealed significant interactions (Fs < 1). 
Discussion 
Size of problem space exerted a significant effect on both primary dependent 
variables – the larger problem led to more time and more moves before the giving-up 
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decision. The effect of prior probability was in the predicted direction, but did not 
reach significance for either time or number of moves. 
The results for confidence-unsolvable were significant and imply a direct 
effect of both independent variables upon confidence. A larger problem size and 
higher prior probability of solvability resulted in lower confidence-unsolvable ratings 
after giving up. The effect of prior probability is in line with the predictions of the 
PG-C account, if one assumes that confidence ratings directly reflect P (strictly, 1-P), 
but the effect of problem size on confidence-unsolvable appears to be outside the 
scope of the current theory. 
The ideas that participants may give up after a fixed time or after a fixed 
number of new states do not predict an effect of problem size or prior probability 
upon time or number of moves. The data count strongly against these two simple 
models. 
However, the idea that participants will use an exit-latency threshold is offered 
support by the data. Indeed this account can also explain the effect of problem size on 
confidence-unsolvable. Clearer evidence against the exit latency model would be 
reliable effects of prior probability on time and number of moves. 
The absence of a significant effect of prior probability on total time is the main 
discrepancy between our results and the PG-C account. It is worth noting that the 
open water jars used in this study may afford a wider variety of strategies than do the 
"closed” variety that was studied by Atwood and Polson (1976). For example, it is 
possible to search mentally for algebraic combinations of the jars' capacities that 
achieve the target quantity. The PG-C account should still apply to such strategies; 
nevertheless a mix of strategies among participants will weaken the statistical power 
of the experiment, especially in light of the argument above that individual variation 
Giving Up Problem Solving 18 
in G likely allows effort (time) and probability (reported confidence-unsolvable) to be 
traded off to some extent. 
Experiment 2 
To address this concern the second experiment used “closed” water jars (i.e. 
problems in which the only operators were transfer of water from one jar to another – 
jars could not be filled, nor could water be discarded). Algebraic strategies are less 
likely with closed jars, because fewer simple algebraic combinations of quantities are 
readily available. For example, in the open jar problem A=15, B=36, C= 9, it is easy 
to create the quantity 2A - C in B by filling A and transferring it to B twice, then 
filling C from B. It is similarly simple to create A+C, B-C, B-2C etc. When the total 
quantity of water is fixed, many fewer of these simple expressions can be achieved as 
subgoals. We hope this might reduce variation in strategy choice and increase the 
power of the experiment. 
Method 
Design 
The design was as for Experiment 1. The precise problems were different, but 
the factors and their relative levels were unchanged. 
Participants 
Fifty two undergraduates from Cardiff University were paid £5.00 (US $7.91) 
or offered course credit to participate. 
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Materials 
The experiment used “closed” water jar problems. In all problems used in this 
experiment the capacity of the jars decreased from A to B to C. The capacity of jar A 
was an even number of units. In the initial state A was full and B and C were empty, 
in the goal state the water from A was evenly distributed between A and B. Because 
of this fixed formula, problems can be specified by listing the capacities of the three 
jars. 
Problems were presented on an interactive computer display as for Experiment 
1 but without the Fill-and Empty-jar buttons. 
Each participant attempted four problems, with the set of problems varying 
with experimental condition. The first problem was always unsolvable, and the 
experimental hypotheses relate to this problem. For half the participants the problem 
was A=10, B=9, C=8, which has 10 states in its problem space, for the remainder it 
was A=12, B=9, C=7 (25 states). 
Procedure 
The procedure was exactly as in Experiment 1, except for the difference in 
problems noted above, as well as a different practice problem, (A=18, B=11, C=5). 
Results 
Table 2 shows the untransformed means and standard deviations for all 
dependent measures according to experimental condition. Only 3 participants visited 
all the states of the smaller problem. Analyses were conducted as for Experiment 1. 
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Before ANOVA, times and number of moves were log-transformed [for number of 
moves, ln(N+1) was used as 1 participant made no moves]. These transforms made no 
difference to the pattern of effects. 
Both time and number of moves were greater for the large problem space than 
for the small problem space [Time, F(1, 48) = 10.75, MSe = .04, p < .01, !
2
p = .18; 
Moves, F(1,48) = 9.20, MSe = .10, p < .01 !
2
p = .16]. A high prior probability that the 
problem was solvable lengthened the time spent solving, F(1, 48) = 5.93, MSe = .04, p 
< .05, !2p = .11, and increased the number of moves, although this effect was 
marginal, F(1,48) = 3.66, MSe = .10, p = .06, !
2
p = .07. 
Confidence-unsolvable was higher for the smaller problem space and for the 
lower prior probability of solvability but these effects were not significant [Problem 
Size, F(1,48) = 1.04, !2p = 02; Prior Probability, F(1,48) = 1.76, !
2
p = .03]. 
No interactions were significant (Fs < 1.6). 
Discussion 
Both main predictions for the rational PG-C model were supported. When 
problems were large and prior probability of solvability was high participants took 
longer to give up. The effects on confidence-unsovlable that were reported in 
Experiment 1 were not replicated, although the trends were in the same directions. 
The results across both experiments count against all the simplest stopping 
rules. The effect of problem size upon time to give up directly contradicts the 
hypothesis that participants give up after a fixed time or a fixed number of new states. 
The effect of prior probability on time to give up in Experiment 2 suggests that the 
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decision to quit is not entirely a matter of judging the problem to have been 
exhausted. 
The main inconsistency in the results of the first two experiments is that the 
effect of prior probability is less robust than we expected. The establishment of this 
effect with closed problems supports our speculation that strategies for open jar 
problems may be more various. Additionally, the predicted effect of prior probability 
on confidence is unstable: reliable in Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2. Finally, a 
limitation of the method in the first two experiments is that moves were not time-
stamped, preventing a direct test of the exit-latency rule. The next experiment 
addresses all these issues. 
Experiment 3 
To gain more insight into the relation between confidence judgments and 
giving-up decisions, and into the effects of prior probability in the two separate 
problem types we asked participants to provide regular ratings of confidence-
unsolvable as they solved each problem (in addition to post-giving up confidence-
unsolvable ratings). Following Metcalfe (1986) we asked for these ratings every 
fifteen seconds. Prior probability was manipulated as before but only the larger 
problem of each type was used. Problem size was not manipulated as it produced a 
reliable effect on time to give up for both open and closed jar problems. The larger 
problems were chosen to provide longer problem solving protocols. 
Our theoretical assumption is that reported confidence-unsolvable reflects 
participants' judgments of the problem during problem solving.  But in the first two 
experiments, by asking for these judgments only after a quit decision, we have run the 
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risk that the judgments will be adjusted post-hoc, using remembered aspects of the 
problem solving experience. By instead collecting judgments every fifteen seconds 
we maximise the chances of reports reflecting just those metacognitive states that are 
active in the problem solving process; we can also test the assumption that 
confidence-unsolvable will increase as problem solving continues. Additionally, by 
prompting participants to focus on the probability that the problem is solvable, we 
hope that the regular confidence ratings may encourage participants to work for 
longer on problems, so as not to quit having just reported low confidence-unsolvable. 
This would effectively increase G, in that quitting would only occur when P is low 
and confidence-unsolvable is relatively high. 
Further, in this experiment we time-stamped all interactive behavior. This 
additionally allowed us to look at the temporal distribution of new-state visits during 
each problem solving episode. From these data we can directly ask whether 
participants’ behavior is well-characterized by an exit-latency heuristic – quitting 
once a threshold of elapsed time since a new state has been passed. 
Method 
Design 
Once again a 2 ! 2 between-subjects design was employed. One factor was 
“Prior Probability”, manipulated in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2. The 
other factor was the “Problem Type” as half the participants were given an Open 
problem as in Experiment 1 and the other half received a Closed problem as in 
Experiment 2. 
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Participants 
Sixty four students from the University of Manchester were each paid £5.00 
(US $7.91) for participation in the experiment. 
Materials 
A Visual Basic program replicated the interfaces described in Experiments 1 
and 2. Every time the participant clicked a button the program recorded and time-
stamped the event. All interactions with the program were recorded and time-
stamped. The problems with a large problem size from Experiments 1 and 2 were 
used. Thus, the Open jar problem was 15, 36, 9, 14 and the Closed jar problem was 
12, 9, 7. 
Procedure 
Participants were informed that while attempting a problem they would be 
interrupted every 15 seconds and asked to make a judgement about how confident 
they were that the problem was unsolvable. To familiarise participants with this 
process they were given a computerised 5 disk Tower of Hanoi problem and 
interrupted in the same way as during the experimental problem. The Tower of Hanoi 
problem was terminated by the program after 2 minutes (none of the participants 
solved the problem in this time). 
Participants were then given instructions, a practice water jar task (in which 
they also were interrupted to practise giving confidence ratings) and the Prior 
Probability manipulation in the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2 before 
attempting the experimental problem. 
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The program interrupted participants 15 seconds after beginning the 
experimental problem and asked participants to make a confidence-unsolvable 
judgement. When they had completed this judgement the program returned to the 
problem solving task for another 15 seconds before interrupting again in the same 
way. This process continued until participants abandoned the task whereupon they 
were required to make another final confidence-unsolvable judgement. 
During interruptions the interface displaying the problem was replaced by the 
question requiring a confidence-unsolvable judgement. This question was the same as 
in Experiments 1 and 2. For the second interruption and all subsequent confidence-
unsolvable judgements the confidence level from the immediately preceding 
judgement was highlighted in yellow. 
After abandoning the first problem participants were not given the remaining 3 
problems and instead were debriefed as to the purpose of the experiment. 
Results and Discussion 
Because of their different structure, closed and open jar problems were 
analysed separately throughout. The effects of prior probability on time, number of 
moves, and confidence-unsolvable were examined using independent t tests. Times 
and number of moves were log-transformed before conducting analyses but, as in the 
previous experiments, this made no difference to the pattern of effects. All times 
reported in this section were log transformed before analysis and all significant (p < 
.05) comparisons or correlations are included. 
Time spent making the confidence judgements every 15 seconds was excluded 
from time measures; however, inclusion of these time data did not affect the pattern of 
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significance. For the initial set of analyses “confidence-unsolvable” was the final 
confidence judgement that was made after abandoning the task. 
The means and standard deviations for each condition are given in Table 3. 
Higher prior probability of solvability lengthened problem solving time for both 
problem types [Closed jar, t(30) = 2.10, SE = .07, p < .05, !2p = .13; Open jar, t(30) = 
3.51, SE = .11, p < .01, !2p = .29] and increased the number of moves for both 
problem types, although the effect on moves was marginal [Closed jar, t(30) = 1.71, 
SE = .10, p = .098, !2p = .09; Open jar, t(30) = 2.04, SE = .15, p = .051, !
2
p = .12.]. 
Confidence-unsolvable after giving up was higher for low prior probability of 
problem solvability but this effect was not significant for the closed jar problem, t(30) 
= 1.37, !2p = .06, or the open jar problem, t(30) = 1.11, !
2
p = .04. 
For both problem types there was an effect of prior probability on time and 
number of moves but no effect upon final judgments of confidence-unsolvable. For 
the closed jars this replicates the findings from Experiment 2, whereas for the open 
jars it replicates the direction of the trends, but different comparisons reached 
significance. In Experiment 1, there was a reliable effect of prior probability on 
confidence-unsolvable but not upon time or number of moves. The main difference in 
procedure between Experiments 1 and 3 was that participants were required to make 
confidence ratings throughout problem solving in Experiment 3. Because participants 
used these ratings to reflect changes in confidence throughout a problem solving 
episode, and because they had no way of estimating how long this episode would last, 
we suspect that the effect on post-hoc confidence unsolvable is compromised by 
ceiling effects. This argument is supported by the fact that confidence-unsolvable 
scores after giving up were considerably higher in Experiment 3 than in Experiments 
1 and 2. 
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Confidence Progression over Time 
The confidence-unsolvable ratings every 15 seconds are plotted in Figure 2 as 
means for each of the four conditions. Because participants gave up at different times 
some participants did not contribute to the means at the later time points. To provide a 
broad indication of the proportions: 91% of participants made confidence ratings at 75 
seconds, 69% at 150s, 34% at 225s and 23% at 300s. 
Considering the ratings from all participants who made at least 10 ratings (an 
arbitrary cut-off leaving at least 9 participants in each cell) , we computed 2 (Prior 
Probability) * 10 (Time of rating) ANOVAs for closed and open problems with 
repeated measures on the second variable.  In both ANOVAs there were significant 
main effects of probability and of time. Open problems, Probability: F(1, 23) = 6.58, 
MSe = 43.82, p < .05, !
2
p = .22; Time: F(9, 207) = 8.74, MSe = .72, p < .001, !
2
p = .28; 
Interaction F(9, 207) = 1.27, MSe = .72, p = .077, !
2
p = .07. Closed problems, 
Probability: F(1, 19) = 5.30, MSe = 48.81, p < .05, !
2
p = .22; Time: F(9, 171) = 20.16, 
MSe = .83, p < .001, !
2
p = .52; Interaction F < 1. 
The effect of Probability was significant for the first judgement after 15 
seconds, Open problems [t(30) = 2.15, SE = .84, p < .05, !2p = .13]; Closed problems 
[t(30) = 3.61, SE = .67, p < .01, !2p = .30] and for the tenth judgement after 150 
seconds, Open problems [t(23) = 2.83, SE = 1.07, p < .01, !2p = .26]; Closed problems 
[t(19) = 2.47, SE = 1.00, p < .05, !2p = .24]. Overall these effects offer support for our 
hypothesis that initial confidence-unsolvable will be affected by prior probability and 
that confidence-unsolvable will increase as problem solving continues. 
To further understand the process of giving up we also consider measures of 
task performance over time and their relation to giving up. 
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Time-course measures and quit decisions 
Water jar problems do not have such an unambiguous measure of task 
performance as do the word-finding tasks used by Payne, Duggan, & Neth (2007). 
However, Atwood & Polson (1976) demonstrated that for closed jar problems finding 
a new “state” or combination of water across the three jars is treated as the primary 
subgoal. We therefore used “new states found” as a proxy for task performance and 
used this measure to relate performance on the water jar problems to the decision to 
quit the task. 
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of some of the measures analysed in 
Payne et al. (2007). Exit latency refers to the amount of time between the last new 
state found and the decision to quit. Also included is the longest interval between 
finding new states – all participants had at least one between-states interval that was 
longer than their time to make a first move. 
For both problem types the effect of prior probability of solvability upon 
number of new states found and exit latencies was tested. Higher prior probability of 
problem solvability meant that more new states were found for both the closed jar 
problem, t(30) = 2.66, SE = 1.06, p < .05, !2p = .19, and the open jar problem, t(30) = 
2.36, SE = 5.35, p < .05, !2p = .16, and that exit latencies were longer for the open jar 
problem, t(30) = 2.60, SE = .15, p < .05, !2p = .18. 
The exit-latency heuristic was tested by comparing the exit latency for each 
participant with their longest time to find a new state. In all four conditions the 
longest between-states interval was longer than the exit latency: High Prior 
Probability closed jar, t(15) = 2.15, SE = .13, p < .05, !2p = .24; Low Prior Probability 
closed jar, t(15) = 2.61, SE = .16, p < .05, !2p = .31; High Prior Probability open jar, 
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t(15) = 3.15, SE = .11, p < .05, !2p = .40; Low Prior Probability open jar, t(15) = 5.77, 
SE = .09, p < .001, !2p = .69. Therefore, these data appear to rule out a simple 
heuristic based on exit latency (this was also the conclusion of Payne et al., 2007; 
Hutchinson et al., 2008 and Wilke, Hutchinson, Todd & Czienskowski, 2009). 
General Discussion 
Across three experiments we have gathered reliable evidence that the decision 
to give up problem solving is affected by the size of the problem and by the prior 
probability that the problem is solvable. 
That problem solvers take longer to quit a bigger problem can be explained by 
a rational model: when a problem contains many intermediate states, problem solvers' 
considered partial plans are more likely to be judged as worth pursuing. In particular, 
when the hill-climbing strategy is used, single-step plans in a bigger problem are more 
likely to lead to novel states, which receive higher estimates of P and lower estimates 
of C. Thus, if giving-up decisions reflect PG-C approaching zero for all currently 
applicable moves they will be delayed when the problem space is bigger. 
The prior probability effect can be explained by the same model: when the 
prior probability of a problem being solvable is lower, all subsequently updated 
estimates of PG-C for partial plans are reduced. As a direct consequence, a situation 
where PG-C approaches 0 for all partial plans is reached in fewer moves. These 
effects are therefore consistent with the idea that problem solvers are continually 
monitoring the quality of next-states in terms of the probability of them leading to the 
goal, as assumed by Anderson’s rational analysis of problem solving by hill climbing. 
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The results for confidence-unsolvable are less stable. When participants were 
asked to make confidence ratings every 15 seconds (Experiment 3) these intermediate 
ratings behaved in a way consistent with our assumption that they would reflect the 
same judgments of probability of success that underpin move-choice and giving-up 
decisions. That is to say, initial confidence-unsolvable is affected by prior probability 
and increases with experience with the unsolvable problem. Similarly, the tendency 
for final post-giving up ratings of confidence-unsolvable to be affected by prior 
probability is in line with predictions, but these effects are only significant in 
Experiment 1, where there was an additional effect of problem size on confidence-
unsolvable. Perhaps this is a simple matter of experimental power, together with the 
measurement noise in how people interpret the confidence scales. Nevertheless our 
data show that confidence judgments hold some promise as a way of tracking the 
timecourse of quit decisions. 
Our data count against some of the simplest stopping rules that might have 
been supposed to be operational in the decision to quit a problem. Participants 
evidently do not simply allow themselves a fixed amount of time to succeed, or a 
fixed number of new intermediate states, nor do they always keep working on a 
problem until they have exhausted all the possible states (Experiments 1, 2, 3). 
Participants do not set a simple exit-latency threshold – quitting a problem after a 
certain time in which no new states are discovered (Experiment 3). 
One attractive aspect of the account of giving up problem solving that we have 
sketched is that it is integrated with a rational account of move-choice during ongoing 
problem solving. The account supposes that no special reasoning is required to inform 
the giving-up decision. Rather, this decision is a by-product of the evaluation of 
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moves: A problem solver quits when the evaluation of every considered move fails to 
justify the cost of its enactment. 
Note, however, that this estimation of probabilities and costs of particular 
partial plans incorporates some global parameters of the problem, such as prior 
probability of solvability, and of the problem solving episode, such as effort 
expended. These parameters affect the judgment of all partial plans and may play a 
relatively minor role in the choice between partial plans (although, according to the 
rational analysis, such a role does exist). 
An interesting possibility which might be explored in future research is that 
overall effort may not in fact be the most appropriate global summary of the problem 
solving episode by which to adjust judgments of probability and cost of success. 
Perhaps, instead, some of the slightly more complex foraging heuristics for estimating 
'patch potential' would work better in this role. For example, effort so far might be 
moderated by some measure of success (such as how many new states closer to the 
goal have been found) as it is in foraging heuristics like Green's rule (Green, 1984; 
Payne, Duggan & Neth, 2007). 
A similar refinement to the PG-C theory is suggested by our finding 
(Experiment 1) that confidence-unsolvable is higher for smaller problem spaces 
(although it must be borne in mind that this effect was not replicated in Experiment 
2). In the current version of the theory, both similarity to the goal state and the 
frequency of visitation affect estimates of both P and C for next states. But it seems 
possible that the number of times a state has been visited should decrease estimates of 
the probability of success from that state more than it should increase estimates of 
cost of success. Cost of success may rather be dominated by the similarity of the state 
to the goal. If this were the case, if PG-C is to approach zero because of the number of 
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revisits to a state, this will require relatively low levels of P. This might explain why 
confidence-unsolvable is higher for smaller problems. 
In summary, then, the current experiments favour an account of giving up as a 
special case of move-choice in problem solving, and count against the simplest 
stopping heuristics that have been considered in foraging theory. Future work may 
profitably consider a fuller integration of these two approaches, for example, by 
allowing foraging heuristics to offer summaries of the problem solving episode that 
play a similar role in the computation of PG-C to 'effort so far' but which are more 
sensitive to other aspects of problem solving experience than pure effort. 
There is much work remaining to develop a full theory of giving up problem 
solving. Our aim in this article has been to introduce this goal as an important one, 
and to provide some basic empirical phenomena that constrain future theories; and a 
suggestion that such developments may fruitfully begin from a rational account of 
problem solving. Further, we propose that our simple experimental innovation of 
presenting participants with problems that may or may not be solvable offers one 
important and efficient way of gathering data in support of this enterprise. 
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Table 1. 
Experiment 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Time to Abandon Problem, 
Number of Moves, Number of States Visited and Confidence that a Problem was 
Unsolvable as a Function of Prior Probability of Problem Solvability and Problem 
Size. 
Prior Problem Time to Number of Number of Confidence 
Probability Size Abandon Moves States Unsolvable 
Problem (No. of Problem (s) Visited 
Solvable states) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
.75 30 198.28 108.80 11.17 12.55 6.08 5.00 0.48 2.44 
.75 218 273.78 113.10 27.00 18.85 15.75 11.30 "0.54 2.09 
.25 30 171.00 70.25 13.42 15.58 6.17 5.37 2.50 1.81 
.25 218 213.80 67.57 14.00 10.15 8.92 5.66 0.95 2.07 
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Table 2. 
Experiment 2: Means and Standard Deviations for Time to Abandon Problem, 
Number of Moves, Number of States Visited and Confidence that a Problem was 
Unsolvable as a Function of Prior Probability of Problem Solvability and Problem 
Size. 
Prior Problem Time to Number of Number of Confidence 
Probability Size Abandon Moves States Unsolvable 
Problem (No. of Problem (s) Visited 
Solvable states) M SD M SD M SD M SD 
.75 10 166.33 72.90 26.46 18.40 8.92 1.85 0.69 2.95 
.75 25 285.42 149.55 36.00 19.38 10.69 3.90 0.31 2.46 
.25 10 149.93 108.85 18.46 18.25 6.85 3.24 2.08 3.01 
.25 25 181.43 63.02 30.77 17.44 9.31 3.12 0.92 2.40 
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Table 3. 
Experiment 3: Means and Standard Deviations for Time to Abandon Problem, 
Number of Moves and Confidence that a Problem was Unsolvable as a Function of 
Prior Probability of Problem Solvability for Open and Closed Water Jar Problems. 
Problem Prior Time to Abandon Number of Moves Confidence 
Type Probability Problem (s) Unsolvable 
Problem 
Solvable M SD M SD M SD 
Closed .75 204.49 106.08 30.00 15.76 3.06 2.26 
Closed .25 140.15 49.84 22.63 14.64 3.94 1.18 
Open .75 419.55 242.54 56.69 47.44 2.75 2.82 
Open .25 222.14 247.59 38.38 34.71 3.69 1.89 
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Table 4. 
Experiment 3: Number of states visited, time between last new state and quitting and 
longest time between finding new states. 
Problem Prior Number of States Exit Latency (s) Longest between 
Type Probability Visited states interval (s) 
Problem 
Solvable M SD M SD M SD 
Closed .75 10.19 3.27 34.02 31.80 59.13 56.65 
Closed .25 7.38 2.68 29.42 35.09 44.78 24.90 
Open .75 28.44 17.93 41.36 51.66 70.09 63.30 
Open .25 15.81 11.70 14.39 13.28 40.69 25.54 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Screenshot of the interface for the open jars problem from Experiment 1. 
Figure 2. Experiment 3: Progression of confidence over time with high and low prior 
probability of solvability for open and closed water jars. Closed = Closed jar problem, 
Open = Open jar problem, Hi = High prior probability of solvability, Lo = Low prior 
probability of solvability. 
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